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CHAP. LV.
Of Politicks.
TO this kind of Philosophy Politicks in the next place appertain, which is the Art of Administring and Ordering Publick Affairs. Now Government is di∣vided into three sorts. Monarchy, which is the Go∣vernment of one Man, or Kingly Soveraignty. Ari∣stocracie, when a few, and those of the Nobility Go∣vern. Democracy, when the meaner sort, or the Com∣mon People bear sway. Neer of kin to th•se is, First Tyranny to Kingship; Oligarchia to Aristocracy; and Anarchy to Democracy. But which of all these Forms of Government is in the first place to be prefer'd, is not yet concluded among Writers. They who assert Mo∣narchy, confirm their Thesis by the Example of Nature, saying, That as there is but one God that governs the Universe, as there is but one Sun among the Stars, one King among the Bees, one Master-Ram in a Flock, one Commanding Bull in a Heard, one chief leader of the Cranes; so in a Nation there ought to be but one King, as Soveraign and Head of the Political Bo∣dy, from which the Members ought in no wise to disagree. This Form of Government Plato, Aristotle, and Apollonius approv'd above the rest; to whom among those of our own Religion, Cyprian and Jerome adhere. But those who extol Aristocracy, say that there is nothing more effectual in the management of great Affairs, than the Consultations of many, and those the most noble. For the Counsels of the chiefest men ought to be best; neither can any one man be compleat in Wisdome, seeing that is onely proper to God himself.
Page 155
To the Judgment of these Men, Solon, Lycurgus, De∣mosthenes, Tully, and almost all the ancient Lawgivers, together with Moses, unanimously subscrib'd. Neither did Plato Diffent from them, affirming that Com∣monwealth or City to be most happily and firmly Con∣stituted, which was Govern'd by wise Men; to whom we may likewise add, without prejudice, the most Noble, as being an Opinion Confirm'd by the com∣mon consent of all Writers. But they who prefer a Popular State, have dignifi'd it with the most agree∣able and specious Title of Isonomie; That is to say, Impartiality in the Administration of Justice. For therein all things are refer'd to the Common Vote, all Councels are carried on by the Multitude; the more certain, by how much the greater Number advice is gi∣ven. Moreover, the Voice of the People is said to be the Voice of God. Hence whatsoever is Enacted by the Generality, whatsoever is Establish'd by the com∣mon consent of the People, that seems to be Ordain'd by God himself, and may be presum'd to be best and most just. Besides, they conclude this Form of Govern∣ment to be safer than that of Aristocracy, as being less subject to Sedition. For the People seldome or never disagree among themselves; but the Nobles very often, and with great Contention. In a popular Government there is all Freedome and Equality, no oppression of Tyranny: where the degrees of Estates are equal, no man is richer than his Neighbour, but all the People Rule and Command by •urns. Democracy there∣fore has been especially commended by Othanes the Persian, Eufrates, and Dion Syracusanus: and we ob∣serve at this time the Venetian and Helvetian Com∣monwealths to be the most flourishing People in the Christian World; renown'd for their Prudence, Pow∣er, Riches and Justice, and no less famous for their Victorious Atchievements. The Athenian Common∣wealth
Page 156
also commanding a large Dominion with great Force and Power, was govern'd only by Democracy, all things being acted by the People, and with the People. The Romans also making use of this Form of Government, became Masters of the greatest part of their Empire under Democracy, and were never in a worse Condition than under the Command of their Kings and Nobility; but chiefly suffered from their Emperours, under whose Command their vast Domi∣nion suffered Shipwrack. So that which of these three Forms is best, is hard to judge, since there is neither of them but has its strong Defenders and Oppugners. Kings, they say, who Command altogether according to their own Will and Pleasure, seldome Govern well, and very rarely without War and great Combustion. Kingly Rule hath also this most unavoydable Mischief in it, that they who before were counted good and just, having obtain'd as it were a Regal Authority, and Liberty to do evil, grow uncontroulable, and the worst of Men; which is verifi'd in Caligula, Nero, Do∣mitian, Mithridates, and many others. Scripture also witnesses the same in Saul, David, and Salomon, Kings chosen by God: and of all the Kings of Juda, few were approved; of the Kings of Israel, none. Empe∣rors also, Kings and Princes that now adays Raign, think themselves Born and Crown'd not for the sake of the People, not for the Good of their Citizens and Commonalty, not to Maintain Justice, but to Defend their own Grandeur and Prerogative; Governing so, as if the Estates of the People were not committed to their Custody, but to be shar'd and divided by them, as their own proper spoyl and prey. They use their Subjects at their pleasure, and as they list themselves, abusing the Power with which they were Entrusted; Oppress their Cities with borrowing, the Common Peo∣ple, some with Taxes, some with Penal Statutes, others
Page 157
with excessive Subsidies and Imposts, without Measure and without End. Or if some more moderate do release the excess of these Grievances, they do it not in respect of the Common good, but for their own Private ends, permitting their Subjects to be at quiet, that they may live at ease themselves; or else to gain to themselves the name of being Mild and Just. Others most severely punish guilty Offenders, Confiscating their Goods, and setting great Fines upon their Heads, not caring how many they take in the same Premu∣nire: For as the Offences of Delinquents are the strength of Tyrants, so does the Multitude of Offenders en∣rich Princes. Being in Italy, I had the honour to be very familiar with a powerful Prince, whom when I once advis'd to suppress the Factions of the Guelphs and Gibellines within his Dominions, he confess'd to me ingenuously, that by means of those Factions, above Twelve thousand Duckets came every Year into his Exchequer. Now where the Nobility Command in chief, there is nothing but Jealousie, Hatred, and Emulation. Rarely therefore they agree in Amity, every one seeking to be Chief, and to make his own Sentence pass. Hence Factions, Seditions, Slaughters, Civil War, and at length, the Total Ruine of the Com∣monwealth. Whereof there are infinite Examples in the Histories both of the Greeks and Latines. And at this day in most of the Cities of Italy, the Effects of those miscarriages are to be seen. But Popular Go∣vernment is Universally accompted the most destru∣ctive, and worst of all. Apollonius with many Rea∣sons disswades Vespatian from it. And Cicero Affirms, That there is neither Reason, Council, Discretion or Diligence among the Vulgar People, as the Poet also sings.
By opposite desires and humours led,
Th' uncertain Vulgar move, once taking Head.
Page 158
Othanes the Persian also asserts, that there is nothing more insolent, nothing more stolid; nothing more proper to the Rabble, than to know; nothing but head∣long, like a Current, to carry all business before 'um. Demosthenes calls the people an Evil Beast. Plato, a Monster with many heads; which Horace doth not forget. And Phalaris writing to Egesippus, All mul∣titudes, saith he, are rash, mad, slothful, apt to change their Opinion, perfidious, uncertain, treacherous, heady, fraudulent, good for nothing but to make a noise, easie to love or condemn. Hence it follows, that he who in governing the Commonwealth strives to please the people, must be contented to submit to a hundred un∣deserved Contumelies. Lycurgus being ask'd why he had not erected a Popular Government in his City, Rather do thou, saith he, submit to a Popular Govern∣ment in thy house. Aristotle also in his Ethicks con∣demns the government of the people to be the worst of all, but the rule of one person to be the best: for the Commonalty is the Ring-leader of Errour, the Mistriss of evil Customs, and a rude heap of Mischief. No Reason, no Authority, no Perswasions can move, where it either wants knowledge, or is in contempt: Therefore are the Vulgar so indocible and obstinate a∣gainst all perswasion, whose nature is so unconstant, always desirous of Novelty, despising the present Au∣thority, not to be curb'd by the learned Admonitions of the Wise, by the Precepts of their Ancestors, Authori∣ty of Magistrates, or Majesty of Princes. This we finde verifi'd in Socrates, question'd by the Athenians about his opinion of the Gods; In Capys the Trojan, delivering his judgment about the bringing in of the Grecian Horse; In Magius the Campanian, advising that Hannibal should not be received into the City; In Paulus Emilius perswading not to fight at the Bat∣t•l of Canna; Lastly, in so many of the Predictions of
Page 159
the Prophets of God, no way obey'd or hearkned to by the people of the Jews. Moreover, as to the Laws and Statutes of the people, how is it possible that any of them should be good or profitable, seeing that it is impossible for the popular Multitude to understand which are good, and which are evil? the greatest part whereof are ignorant labouring Handicraft people, not led by Reason of Justice or Equity, but consisting onely in Number, where there are generally more bad than good: Neither is the determination of Affairs led by Judgment, but guided and turn'd to and fro according to the favour, number and affection of the Multitude: Which Pliny the younger affirms; for the decrees and choices of the people are number'd, not consider'd. For in popular Consultation, that always carries the day, which not the wisest, but the greatest number think most convenient: among whom, while they all accompt themselves equal, there is nothing more unequal than that Equality it self. Nothing therefore can be rightly order'd by the promiscuous heat and headlong fury of the Multitude; nor can a∣ny thing be rightly amended, that shall be found amiss and disadvantageous to the Commonwealth: rather, those Statutes and Decrees which are made and con∣firm'd, and found to be most wholesome for the pub∣lick good, by the rage of the inconsiderate Multitude, are overturn'd and abrogated. Now among all these so various forms of Rule, and administrations of Go∣vernment, most Authors have another, compounded of two particular kinds: Such an one did Solon compose, partly of the Nobles, partly of the People; so making his publick Honours communicable to all. Others thought fit to frame their Political Rules by making a mixture of all three together. Such was the go∣vernment of the Lacedaemonians, for they had a King who was perpetual; but he had little or no Command,
Page 160
only in time of War: then had they a Senate chosen out of the richest and wisest part of the Nobility; moreover, out of the Common People they Created Ten perpetual Ephori, who had power of Life and Death, and were Controulers both of the King and Senate, being Elected out of the Vulgar people. Among the Romans, the Authority of the Senate plainly shew'd that there was an Aristocracy mix'd with their Demo∣cracy; and we find that many things were commanded by the Senate, many things by the People. And at this day, though in many places Kings and Princes do rule at their own pleasures, yet do they make use of the chief Nobility and Gentry in the several Counties and Provinces of their Kingdoms, to transact many Affairs, and of great consequence: from whence hath arose a question, which it is most sate to live under, a good Prince and bad Counsellours, or bad Counsellours and a wicked Prince. Marius Maximus, Julius Capitolinus, and others, choose the latter; notwithstanding that many grave Authors are no way willing to consent to them; finding by experience, that evil Counsellors may be corrected sooner by a good Prince, than an evil Prince be amended by good Counsellers. However, for the good government of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, it is not Philosophy nor Kingcraft, nor any other Sci∣ence that can avail, but the integrity, fidelity, and ability of the Ruler: for a single person may govern best, so may a few, so may the people, provided that in each there be the same intention of Unity and Ju∣stice; but if the designes of each be evil, then can neither rule as they should. But that which convinces the strange rashness of Men addicted to Rule, is this, that when Men in their several stations, some plainly confess themselves ignorant how to Plough and Sow, how to keep Sheep, some how to guide a Ship or govern a Family; yet there is no Man who does not
Page 161
think himself sufficiently gifted to bear Office in a City, to act a King or Prince, or to command great Nations and People, which is the most difficult thing.
Of Politicks.
TO this kind of Philosophy Politicks in the next place appertain, which is the Art of Administring and Ordering Publick Affairs. Now Government is di∣vided into three sorts. Monarchy, which is the Go∣vernment of one Man, or Kingly Soveraignty. Ari∣stocracie, when a few, and those of the Nobility Go∣vern. Democracy, when the meaner sort, or the Com∣mon People bear sway. Neer of kin to th•se is, First Tyranny to Kingship; Oligarchia to Aristocracy; and Anarchy to Democracy. But which of all these Forms of Government is in the first place to be prefer'd, is not yet concluded among Writers. They who assert Mo∣narchy, confirm their Thesis by the Example of Nature, saying, That as there is but one God that governs the Universe, as there is but one Sun among the Stars, one King among the Bees, one Master-Ram in a Flock, one Commanding Bull in a Heard, one chief leader of the Cranes; so in a Nation there ought to be but one King, as Soveraign and Head of the Political Bo∣dy, from which the Members ought in no wise to disagree. This Form of Government Plato, Aristotle, and Apollonius approv'd above the rest; to whom among those of our own Religion, Cyprian and Jerome adhere. But those who extol Aristocracy, say that there is nothing more effectual in the management of great Affairs, than the Consultations of many, and those the most noble. For the Counsels of the chiefest men ought to be best; neither can any one man be compleat in Wisdome, seeing that is onely proper to God himself.
Page 155
To the Judgment of these Men, Solon, Lycurgus, De∣mosthenes, Tully, and almost all the ancient Lawgivers, together with Moses, unanimously subscrib'd. Neither did Plato Diffent from them, affirming that Com∣monwealth or City to be most happily and firmly Con∣stituted, which was Govern'd by wise Men; to whom we may likewise add, without prejudice, the most Noble, as being an Opinion Confirm'd by the com∣mon consent of all Writers. But they who prefer a Popular State, have dignifi'd it with the most agree∣able and specious Title of Isonomie; That is to say, Impartiality in the Administration of Justice. For therein all things are refer'd to the Common Vote, all Councels are carried on by the Multitude; the more certain, by how much the greater Number advice is gi∣ven. Moreover, the Voice of the People is said to be the Voice of God. Hence whatsoever is Enacted by the Generality, whatsoever is Establish'd by the com∣mon consent of the People, that seems to be Ordain'd by God himself, and may be presum'd to be best and most just. Besides, they conclude this Form of Govern∣ment to be safer than that of Aristocracy, as being less subject to Sedition. For the People seldome or never disagree among themselves; but the Nobles very often, and with great Contention. In a popular Government there is all Freedome and Equality, no oppression of Tyranny: where the degrees of Estates are equal, no man is richer than his Neighbour, but all the People Rule and Command by •urns. Democracy there∣fore has been especially commended by Othanes the Persian, Eufrates, and Dion Syracusanus: and we ob∣serve at this time the Venetian and Helvetian Com∣monwealths to be the most flourishing People in the Christian World; renown'd for their Prudence, Pow∣er, Riches and Justice, and no less famous for their Victorious Atchievements. The Athenian Common∣wealth
Page 156
also commanding a large Dominion with great Force and Power, was govern'd only by Democracy, all things being acted by the People, and with the People. The Romans also making use of this Form of Government, became Masters of the greatest part of their Empire under Democracy, and were never in a worse Condition than under the Command of their Kings and Nobility; but chiefly suffered from their Emperours, under whose Command their vast Domi∣nion suffered Shipwrack. So that which of these three Forms is best, is hard to judge, since there is neither of them but has its strong Defenders and Oppugners. Kings, they say, who Command altogether according to their own Will and Pleasure, seldome Govern well, and very rarely without War and great Combustion. Kingly Rule hath also this most unavoydable Mischief in it, that they who before were counted good and just, having obtain'd as it were a Regal Authority, and Liberty to do evil, grow uncontroulable, and the worst of Men; which is verifi'd in Caligula, Nero, Do∣mitian, Mithridates, and many others. Scripture also witnesses the same in Saul, David, and Salomon, Kings chosen by God: and of all the Kings of Juda, few were approved; of the Kings of Israel, none. Empe∣rors also, Kings and Princes that now adays Raign, think themselves Born and Crown'd not for the sake of the People, not for the Good of their Citizens and Commonalty, not to Maintain Justice, but to Defend their own Grandeur and Prerogative; Governing so, as if the Estates of the People were not committed to their Custody, but to be shar'd and divided by them, as their own proper spoyl and prey. They use their Subjects at their pleasure, and as they list themselves, abusing the Power with which they were Entrusted; Oppress their Cities with borrowing, the Common Peo∣ple, some with Taxes, some with Penal Statutes, others
Page 157
with excessive Subsidies and Imposts, without Measure and without End. Or if some more moderate do release the excess of these Grievances, they do it not in respect of the Common good, but for their own Private ends, permitting their Subjects to be at quiet, that they may live at ease themselves; or else to gain to themselves the name of being Mild and Just. Others most severely punish guilty Offenders, Confiscating their Goods, and setting great Fines upon their Heads, not caring how many they take in the same Premu∣nire: For as the Offences of Delinquents are the strength of Tyrants, so does the Multitude of Offenders en∣rich Princes. Being in Italy, I had the honour to be very familiar with a powerful Prince, whom when I once advis'd to suppress the Factions of the Guelphs and Gibellines within his Dominions, he confess'd to me ingenuously, that by means of those Factions, above Twelve thousand Duckets came every Year into his Exchequer. Now where the Nobility Command in chief, there is nothing but Jealousie, Hatred, and Emulation. Rarely therefore they agree in Amity, every one seeking to be Chief, and to make his own Sentence pass. Hence Factions, Seditions, Slaughters, Civil War, and at length, the Total Ruine of the Com∣monwealth. Whereof there are infinite Examples in the Histories both of the Greeks and Latines. And at this day in most of the Cities of Italy, the Effects of those miscarriages are to be seen. But Popular Go∣vernment is Universally accompted the most destru∣ctive, and worst of all. Apollonius with many Rea∣sons disswades Vespatian from it. And Cicero Affirms, That there is neither Reason, Council, Discretion or Diligence among the Vulgar People, as the Poet also sings.
By opposite desires and humours led,
Th' uncertain Vulgar move, once taking Head.
Page 158
Othanes the Persian also asserts, that there is nothing more insolent, nothing more stolid; nothing more proper to the Rabble, than to know; nothing but head∣long, like a Current, to carry all business before 'um. Demosthenes calls the people an Evil Beast. Plato, a Monster with many heads; which Horace doth not forget. And Phalaris writing to Egesippus, All mul∣titudes, saith he, are rash, mad, slothful, apt to change their Opinion, perfidious, uncertain, treacherous, heady, fraudulent, good for nothing but to make a noise, easie to love or condemn. Hence it follows, that he who in governing the Commonwealth strives to please the people, must be contented to submit to a hundred un∣deserved Contumelies. Lycurgus being ask'd why he had not erected a Popular Government in his City, Rather do thou, saith he, submit to a Popular Govern∣ment in thy house. Aristotle also in his Ethicks con∣demns the government of the people to be the worst of all, but the rule of one person to be the best: for the Commonalty is the Ring-leader of Errour, the Mistriss of evil Customs, and a rude heap of Mischief. No Reason, no Authority, no Perswasions can move, where it either wants knowledge, or is in contempt: Therefore are the Vulgar so indocible and obstinate a∣gainst all perswasion, whose nature is so unconstant, always desirous of Novelty, despising the present Au∣thority, not to be curb'd by the learned Admonitions of the Wise, by the Precepts of their Ancestors, Authori∣ty of Magistrates, or Majesty of Princes. This we finde verifi'd in Socrates, question'd by the Athenians about his opinion of the Gods; In Capys the Trojan, delivering his judgment about the bringing in of the Grecian Horse; In Magius the Campanian, advising that Hannibal should not be received into the City; In Paulus Emilius perswading not to fight at the Bat∣t•l of Canna; Lastly, in so many of the Predictions of
Page 159
the Prophets of God, no way obey'd or hearkned to by the people of the Jews. Moreover, as to the Laws and Statutes of the people, how is it possible that any of them should be good or profitable, seeing that it is impossible for the popular Multitude to understand which are good, and which are evil? the greatest part whereof are ignorant labouring Handicraft people, not led by Reason of Justice or Equity, but consisting onely in Number, where there are generally more bad than good: Neither is the determination of Affairs led by Judgment, but guided and turn'd to and fro according to the favour, number and affection of the Multitude: Which Pliny the younger affirms; for the decrees and choices of the people are number'd, not consider'd. For in popular Consultation, that always carries the day, which not the wisest, but the greatest number think most convenient: among whom, while they all accompt themselves equal, there is nothing more unequal than that Equality it self. Nothing therefore can be rightly order'd by the promiscuous heat and headlong fury of the Multitude; nor can a∣ny thing be rightly amended, that shall be found amiss and disadvantageous to the Commonwealth: rather, those Statutes and Decrees which are made and con∣firm'd, and found to be most wholesome for the pub∣lick good, by the rage of the inconsiderate Multitude, are overturn'd and abrogated. Now among all these so various forms of Rule, and administrations of Go∣vernment, most Authors have another, compounded of two particular kinds: Such an one did Solon compose, partly of the Nobles, partly of the People; so making his publick Honours communicable to all. Others thought fit to frame their Political Rules by making a mixture of all three together. Such was the go∣vernment of the Lacedaemonians, for they had a King who was perpetual; but he had little or no Command,
Page 160
only in time of War: then had they a Senate chosen out of the richest and wisest part of the Nobility; moreover, out of the Common People they Created Ten perpetual Ephori, who had power of Life and Death, and were Controulers both of the King and Senate, being Elected out of the Vulgar people. Among the Romans, the Authority of the Senate plainly shew'd that there was an Aristocracy mix'd with their Demo∣cracy; and we find that many things were commanded by the Senate, many things by the People. And at this day, though in many places Kings and Princes do rule at their own pleasures, yet do they make use of the chief Nobility and Gentry in the several Counties and Provinces of their Kingdoms, to transact many Affairs, and of great consequence: from whence hath arose a question, which it is most sate to live under, a good Prince and bad Counsellours, or bad Counsellours and a wicked Prince. Marius Maximus, Julius Capitolinus, and others, choose the latter; notwithstanding that many grave Authors are no way willing to consent to them; finding by experience, that evil Counsellors may be corrected sooner by a good Prince, than an evil Prince be amended by good Counsellers. However, for the good government of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, it is not Philosophy nor Kingcraft, nor any other Sci∣ence that can avail, but the integrity, fidelity, and ability of the Ruler: for a single person may govern best, so may a few, so may the people, provided that in each there be the same intention of Unity and Ju∣stice; but if the designes of each be evil, then can neither rule as they should. But that which convinces the strange rashness of Men addicted to Rule, is this, that when Men in their several stations, some plainly confess themselves ignorant how to Plough and Sow, how to keep Sheep, some how to guide a Ship or govern a Family; yet there is no Man who does not
Page 161
think himself sufficiently gifted to bear Office in a City, to act a King or Prince, or to command great Nations and People, which is the most difficult thing.